India lacks precision for surgical attack

While the US commando troops swooped down the luxurious bungalow in military hill station Abbottabad in Pakistan, the Indian establishment does not have the wherewithal to lead such a precision attack inside the dangerous neighbourhood.
Though Army chief General V K Singh and Air Chief Marshal P V Naik say armed forces are "competent" to carry out an operation similar to the one conducted by the US in Pakistan against al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden, Indian intelligence inputs required for such precision operation would be wanting, according to sources.
Though the elite commando troops of Army’s parachute units are highly trained and are armed with latest weaponry and communication gadgetry, the intelligence paraphernalia, including the Research and Analysis Wing has never been able to provide the military planners with precision data regarding hi-profile targets.
“Indian army special elite troops can operate in all theatres of war, including striking deep in enemy territory. But we never have high quality, actionable info even after 26/11,” says a senior military officer on condition of anonymity.
Military Intelligence lists over four dozen of mobile launch pads used by terrorists to enter Jammu and Kashmir besides nearly two dozen permanent terror training camps run by the Pakistan establishment including the notorious Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Incidentally Abbottabad is listed as a permanent terror base camp run by the ISI but the army never crossed the Line of Control, even in Kargil war.
According to highly reliable sources, the Indian intelligence agencies have rarely given pinpointed inputs to security forces, due to which causality figure of specialised forces in anti-terror operations have been high.
At the launch of Operation Pawan, the codename assigned for Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to take control of Jaffna from the LTTE in late 1987, was a disaster primarily due to lack of intelligence available to the elite commando troops that swooped down Jaffna University, the then headquarters of Prabhakaran.
According to officials, three platoons of elite 10 Para Commandos were to spread in the the football field of Jaffna University, give covering fire for the subsequent group of commandos, barge the hostel and link up to main troops. The intel inputs given was that there could some minor resistance as LTTE cadre could be armed with a few assault rifles.
However, after the first helicopter had landed on ground, the commandos came under heavy semi-automatic and automatic fire from the hostel. The troops in the second helicopter barely managed to slither down. LTTE was armed with even rocket launchers and motors, which wasn’t part of the intelligence brief, which resulted in killing of nearly two dozen commandos and army officials.
The commandos were caught unaware inside enemy territory with heavy firing. They were fighting with limited ammunition for nearly 36 hours till an armoured regiment was ordered to blow and link up with the commandos. The Oct 12, 1987 operation had gone totally wrong due to poor intelligence inputs by the RAW and other agencies, according to sources.
Similarly intelligence inputs for even routine operations in Jammu and Kashmir are sketchy often endangering the lives of security forces.
The files maintained by the Intelligence Bureau, RAW and MI are generally of routine nature. Though each formation and branches maintain their own records, most intelligence is non-actionable.
An intelligence unit had a secret file on former President Pravez Musharraf, the intel was of routine nature include what liquor he drank or how he liked to socialise. The vital points including how he operated the Pakistan army or controlled the ISI were not listed, according to sources.
Interestingly, while India never has had the policy of hot pursuit, though it has actively been debated in war rooms South and North Block and intelligence headquarters in New Delhi, the troops are ready if ordered to conduct any operation in all war theatres.
However, post 26/11 after which a lot of emphasis has been stressed on rejuvenating the intelligence agencies are yet to bear fruits.